Research has shown that password security practices typically conflict with general usability principles. Though the challenges faced by low-literacy users when creating and managing passwords are likely to extend beyond those experienced by the general public, little research has been done to explore password usability in this at-risk group. This survey of 20 low-literacy participants aims to examine password behaviors within this population, including password creation, recall strategies, and perceptions of password strength and security. It expands on the work of Chisnell and Newby (2015) based on a nationwide survey exploring password use, password creation strategies, and perceptions regarding password security. Thus, this study allows for comparison between password use and perceptions among the broader population and those of users with low literacy skills. These results provide important insights into patterns of use and mental models of password requirements and password security among lowliteracy users.
INTRODUCTION
For years, research has shown that password security practices strongly conflict with general usability principles. Often, security measures such as password composition policies seek to increase a user's password strength without considering the goals or cognitive ability of the user . Working memory limitations, memory decay due to infrequent use, and difficulty recalling non-meaningful passwords all make the process of creating and recalling passwords a significant cognitive burden. This process is made even more difficult by the proliferation of passwords in daily life, from bank pins to device passwords and account credentials. In order to meet the cognitive demands of password use, individuals often rely on strategies that increase password memorability at the cost of reducing password strength and security. These strategies were recently explored by a national survey funded by the National Institute of Standards and Technology asking 300 respondents to describe their password use, their strategies for creating passwords, and their perceptions regarding password security (Chisnell & Newby, 2015) .
The challenges relating to password usability weigh even more heavily on the nearly half of the U.S. population that reads at Basic or Below Basic levels as measured by the National Adult Literacy Survey (Kutner, 2007) . Limited vocabulary, low computer literacy, and difficulty typing and spelling already put such users at a disadvantage when using the web (Zarcadoolas, Blanco, Boyer, & Pleasant, 2002) . Internet users with low literacy skills face challenges in navigating, searching, and reading information online Kodagoda & Wong, 2008; Summers & Summers, 2005) . They face particular difficulties in navigating forms online-including challenges in creating usernames and passwords (Summers et al., 2006) . For these internet users, the strain caused by password usability issues adds to their existing cognitive burden. Despite this increased challenge, little research has been done to explore password usability in this at-risk group.
The current survey of 20 low literacy participants aims to examine password behaviors within this population, including password creation, recall strategies, and perceptions of password strength and security. It expands on the work of Chisnell and Newby, allowing for some comparison between the password creation strategies and perceptions around password security across the broader population and those with low literacy skills. 
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
When given minimal restrictions, users (whether high-or low-literacy) tend to create simple passwords comprised of one or two words (Proctor, Lien, Vu, Schultz, & Salvendy, 2002) , often using meaningful words or names to maximize the password's memorability (Sasse, Brostoff, & Weirich, 2001; Shay et al., 2010) . While these passwords may be easier to remember, their use of dictionary words makes them more vulnerable to compromise from hacking or guessing. Even when stricter policies are in place, users often attempt to circumvent security measures by following predicable and easy to remember patterns, such as capitalizing the first letter of the word and adding a memorable number to the end (e.g. John2008) (Chisnell & Newby, 2015; Proctor et al., 2002) .
Poor understanding of security practices is a contributing factor to the creation of insecure passwords, as many users do not possess the proper knowledge to evaluate a password's risk of being cracked (Adams, Sasse, & Lunt 1997; Adams & Sasse, 1999; Inglesant & Sasse, 2010) . Additionally, many users underestimate the occurrence of hacking as well as the potential effects of a compromised account. Users often perceive their accounts as being lowrisk, thinking their accounts have little value to hackers and are likely not to be targeted (Sasse, Brostoff, & Weirich, 2001) . Hackers are often visualized as humans rather than as programs or algorithms, with users assuming that unknown individuals would have a harder time compromising their account (Gaw & Felten, 2006) . Some users also assume that accounts that are used less often are more secure than those used frequently (Stobert, 2014) .
The creation of insecure passwords is not solely due to insufficient knowledge of online security practices, as there is a definite gap between what users know and what they are willing to implement. A 2006 study of 238 college students showed that while half or more of them (50%-73%) were aware of various best practices for creating secure passwords, the number of students who actually used these strategies was much lower. For example, though 63.5% of participants were aware that they should use seven or more characters in their password to increase security, only 35.5% did so. This disparity was even more pronounced when it came to the use of special characters in their passwords: while 50.8% were aware of this security measure, only 4.8% actually included special characters. Individuals with knowledge of password security are often willing to sacrifice password strength for convenience and memorability. In some cases, the strength of the password chosen is contextual, as some users save more complex passwords for sites that contain vulnerable personal data (Adams, Sasse, & Lunt 1997; Hoonakker, Bornoe, & Carayon, 2009 ).
Some websites and organizations attempt to overcome the user's lack of knowledge or willingness to comply with password security recommendations by enforcing restrictive password composition policies. However, forcing users to adhere to complex requirements only increases the cognitive burden on the user, making it more difficult to create and later recall the password (Inglesant & Sasse, 2010; Proctor et al., 2002) . In a large-scale study of user behaviors under different password composition policies, only 17.7% of users were able to successfully create a password on their first try under the strictest requirement setting (which required passwords to have at least 8 characters, both upper and lower case letters, at least one symbol and one digit, and not containing a dictionary word) (Komanduri et al., 2011) . 25% of the participants in this condition dropped out before successfully completing the task, and the remaining participants averaged 3.35 password creation attempts before their password was accepted. In contrast, the initial success rate for the simplest password requirement setting (create a password at least 8 characters long) was 88.6%. The dropout rate for this group lowered to 14.7%, and only required an average of 1.13 attempts to successfully create a password.
Users are often reluctant to change passwords as the burden of creating and learning a new password is high (Inglesant & Sasse, 2010) . When trying to cope with password requirements across several accounts, users often resort to poor security practices such as recording or reusing passwords (Hoonakker, Bornoe, & Carayon, 2009; Inglesant & Sasse, 2010; Stobert, 2014) . Security practices often warn against password reuse, as a single cracked password can result in multiple compromised accounts; however, forcing users to remember passwords for more than 4 or 5 accounts can greatly reduce password memorability (Adams & Sasse, 1999) . As the average user has approximately 25 password-protected accounts online (Florencio & Herley, 2007) , password reuse is a common coping strategy for managing multiple accounts. The average number of sites that share a password is 5.67, with strong passwords being reused less often than weak ones (Florencio & Herley, 2007; Notoatmodjo & Thomborson, 2009) . Though password expiration policies can be used to prevent password reuse, this practice can reinforce poor password security practices. Requiring frequent password changes can result in users creating less secure and more memorable passwords in order to reduce the cognitive strain on their memory. These users are also more likely to write their password down or disclose their password to another person (Adams & Sasse, 1999 ).
These problems become even more acute for those who need to use online accounts but who do not read well.
METHODS
This small-scale study, based on intensive interviews with 20 low literacy participants using the survey goals of the NIST password study (Chisnell & Newby, 2015) , was conducted between August 2014 and April 2015. The study took place in the Usability Lab at the University of Baltimore in Baltimore, Maryland. In order to participate in the survey, the participants were required to qualify as low literate, i.e., reading at the eighth grade level or below as measured by the Rapid Estimate of Adult Literacy in Medicine (REALM; Davis et al., 1991) . The REALM test is comprised of a list of sixty-six words that a participant reads aloud as a facilitator keeps score of words read correctly. The REALM score is the number of correct words a participant pronounces. For recruitment, the participants also self-identified as having passwords for several different categories of accounts requiring passwords present in the survey.
The survey was conducted as an interview between a moderator and the participant. The moderator asked the participants survey questions and captured their responses through webcam video recording using Morae 3.3.3 computer software from TechSmith, with backup audio recording. The moderator also took written notes on paperbased copies of the survey questions. The survey questions used in the interview were adapted from the Usability of Personal Passwords Survey developed by Chisnell and Newby (2015) . The participants were instructed not to state their name or any part of their passwords during the recorded interview. Participants were also encouraged to expound on their answers in order to capture additional information about their password creation strategies and digital habits related to password use. The interviews took an average of 25 minutes to complete and participants were compensated for participating.
Data from the larger nationwide study was used as a comparison group for selected findings. This national survey included 300 participants who filled out an online survey using SurveyGizmo. Participants were screened to make sure they represented a range of geographic locations, ages, occupation, educational level, and income. The survey took the online respondents an average of 45 minutes to complete.
Participant demographics
Twenty participants (10 male and 10 female) took part in the survey. All of the participants were low literate, reading at or below the 8th grade level. In addition, all of the participants were African American living in or close by Baltimore, Maryland. The participants ranged in age from 18 to 62, with an average age of about 37 years old. The range of the Rapid Estimate of Adult Literacy in Medicine (REALM; Davis et al., 1991) scores was 5-60, with the average being about 49.5. All participants in the study scored 60 or below on the REALM. Seven participants completed only some high school. Two participants were enrolled in Job Corps. Six participants had graduated from high school. One participant had completed GED requirements. Three participants had graduated from high school and completed some college. One participant had earned a Bachelor's Degree.
Ten participants were currently unemployed, five were currently receiving social security disability support, and five were currently employed in occupations related to commercial cleaning, security, and education fields.
When participants were asked about their level of experience using computers: Beginner, Average, Advanced, or Expert, five participants self-identified as "beginner," nine as "average," five as "advanced,", and one as "expert." In contrast, in the larger nationwide survey, 47% of respondents self-identified as average, 42% as advanced, and 9% as experts. Only 2% considered themselves novices (Chisnell & Newby, 2015) .
Survey interviews
Questions administered in the interviews were originally developed for the Usability of Personal Passwords Survey developed for a national survey by Chisnell and Newby (2015) funded by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. For the current study, questions were asked orally, with the moderator adapting the questions during each interview as needed to maintain clarity for the participants, who not only had low literacy skills but were also sometimes unfamiliar with specific technology-related terms. Questions asked in the survey attempted to explore these three persistent areas:
• The number of personal accounts and passwords that the participants have
• The strategies participants use for creating and managing passwords
• Feelings that participants have about password requirements for personal online accounts. (Chisnell & Newby, 2015) Analysis Observations recorded during the interviews were supplemented by watching the video recordings. Participants' responses were categorized according to the answer choices provided in the original survey, supplemented as needed by the addition of new categories generated from the participant responses. Three observers independently agreed on the meaning and application of these additional categories.
Quantitative analysis of survey results was completed using SPSS 16. For ratings of password security and considerations for ease of typing/entering and ease of remembering passwords, independent t-tests were run to test for significant differences between high-and lowliteracy participants. In all statistical tests, an alpha value of p < .05 was used to determine significance. N values varied across analyses as not all participants owned each type of account, and some participants chose to skip certain questions.
RESULTS

Types of password protected accounts and devices
Use of online accounts varied among low literacy participants (see Table 1 ). While all participants had at least one email and social media account, less than half had accounts with highly sensitive information such as banking (35%), bill payment (30%), or healthcare (10%). After email and social media, device passwords were among the most common password types, with 80% of participants having a password on their mobile device (e.g., ) and 65% having a computer password at home.
The lowest number of password-protected accounts/devices for one participant was 4, while the highest was 17. The median number of password-protected accounts and devices among the participants was 8. In contrast, in the larger nationwide study, participants reported an average of 3.0 shopping accounts, 2.9 email accounts, 2.6 bill pay accounts, 2.3 social network accounts, and 1.9 banking accounts, suggesting an average of more than 12 accounts per individual (Chisnell & Newby, 2015) .
Due to the reuse of passwords across different accounts, the number of unique passwords each low-literacy participant had created was always less than their total number of accounts and devices. The lowest number of unique passwords in use by one participant was 1, while the highest was 9. The median number of passwords was 4.
(This information was not reported in the national study.)
Structure and creation strategies for new passwords
Strategies for creating passwords were fairly similar across low-literacy participants. All participants used personal information to generate their passwords in order to make them memorable and easier to recall-typically involving common names, words, and phrases. In comparison, in the national survey, only 28% of the participants employed common names, words, and phrases in creating their passwords for email (the most popular category).
None of the participants actively used any system-generated passwords, or any passwords that involved random combinations of words or letters. (In comparison, 9% of the users in the national survey used system-generated passwords for email.) However, one participant did mention using a system-generated password in the past. She explained that she no longer does so: Interestingly, not all participants created their own passwords, with five of the twenty participants reporting that they receive help creating their password from either a friend or family member. However, the structure of the passwords created by others was fairly similar to the structure of passwords created independently.
Most participants did not use any special characters in their passwords, with only two reporting use of any special characters in any of their passwords. (This did not correspond to any of the categories used in the national survey.) Fifteen of the 20 participants described using a name in at least one of their passwords. The names used were either that of the participant or of a close family member, and often involved a first name, nickname, or middle name. Three participants, in addition to using a family member's name in their password, also used other types of names when creating their passwords, including the names of actors, movie characters, or pets. For participants who used numbers in their password (either in conjunction with letters or as a purely numeric password), the numbers used were often derived from personal information, such as their birthday or the birthday of a family member, or other personally significant numeric values such as their social security number, phone number, or address. As one participant explained:
"It's all the things I can remember because all of it refers to me"
Only one participant described using non-meaningful numbers in their passwords; however, he used an easy to remember sequence (e.g., 1234).
Slight alteration of existing passwords, usually through the addition of numbers to the end of the password, was another password creation method used by 11 out of 20 of the participants-compared to 36% of the users from the national survey who utilized this strategy with email passwords. Participants often described using this method when a password was compromised or when it didn't meet the stated requirements (e.g., not enough characters, both numbers and letters are required, cannot use previous passwords). As an example, one participant described having a total of two passwords, one that was a name and one that was the same name with numbers after it. The password that contained the name and the numbers was routinely used when the system rejected her first password.
While most participants described choosing passwords they thought would be difficult for another person to guess, only four participants used additional strategies to attempt to disguise their password. As reported above, two participants used a special character in their password, while another participant spelled the name she used in her password backwards. Another participant used a memorable set of numbers in her password but alternated between writing the numbers out and using numeric values (e.g., 1two3four5).
Only one participant described using a non-alphanumeric password, which he used to unlock his phone. Though this password required him to trace a pattern on the screen of his phone, the participant still made the pattern in the shape of a letter in his name to make it easier to remember.
Challenges of creating passwords
Generally, participants did not feel that they had any substantial difficulty creating passwords, often because they reused or recycled old passwords. Only one participant described abandoning the process of creating a nonessential account due to difficulty creating a password that met the site's requirements. Other participants did describe situations where passwords were rejected. A few participants described overcoming password requirements by adding (or rearranging) additional letters or number to an existing password. Three participants also described having their password rejected because another member had already used that specific password. (It seems likely that these participants were mis-remembering difficulties with creating usernames as difficulties with creating passwords.)
Ease of entering and remembering
Despite the difficulties with typing and spelling experienced by many low-literacy users, there was no significant difference in how high-and low-literacy users rate ease of entering/typing as a consideration for creating a password for any of the six major account types explored (see Table 2 ).
Most participants stated that they had mistyped their password before, though this did not seem to be perceived as a significant cause of delay or frustration. However, lowliteracy participants rated ease of remembering as a significantly higher consideration than high-literacy participants in all six account types (see Table 3 ). As one participant explained her emphasis on ease of use and ease of remembering:
"It was very important because like I said I don't spell that good and I can read that and spell it."
Four participants described abandoning certain accounts because they could not remember the password. Table 2 . Mean ratings for the consideration of "ease of entering/typing" when creating a password. Scale ranges from 0 = not at all important, 1 = slightly important, 2 = somewhat important, to 3 = very important.
"If you forget your password…they will send it to your email, but if I don't know my password how
None of the differences were significant (p>.05)
Password reuse
For low-literacy participants, password reuse was a very common strategy for selecting/creating passwords on for new accounts. Analysis of the results revealed that lowliteracy participants reuse passwords much more frequently than high-literacy participants (see Table 4 ).
In some cases, password reuse allowed participants to avoid engaging with the password requirements of a site, as they could cycle through old passwords that had worked on other sites. Password reuse also aided participant memory, reducing the number of passwords they had to recall.
"I got to keep it the same, that's how I can remember it."
Even for the few participants who wrote down their passwords, most relied on reuse as a password creation strategy.
Perceived password strength
Participants had a high opinion of the security of their passwords, with 15 out of the 20 participants describing their general password strategy as being very or completely secure. In the top three account types used by low-literacy participants (email, social network, and mobile device), low-literacy participants actually rated their passwords as significantly more secure than did high-literacy participants. Low-literacy participants also rated their passwords for personal computers, online entertainment, and banking, as being more secure than high-literacy participants did; however these differences were not significant, possibly due to the smaller sample sizes among low-literacy participants for these types of accounts. In most cases, the participants' passwords were perceived as very secure even though they used personal details such as birthdates or nicknames that could be easily discovered.
"They had me make up a new [password] which is very easy because I can't forget it and no one would think of it because it's my birthday…very few people know the year that I was born." "Some people know my nickname, and some people don't know my real name, so in order to get it you would have to know both my nickname and my whole real name."
It was unclear from the interviews to what extent lowliteracy participants were aware of security threats such as hacking. When describing the security of their passwords, participants described password strength in terms of low guessability rather than resistance to being cracked.
"No one would be able to guess them but me, because they wouldn't know which numbers I put." "I don't think nobody is going to guess it, even though it's right there in their face"
Consistent with previous research findings, some participants perceived threats to password security as coming from individuals who may know the participant rather than anonymous hackers. None of the participants had any sort of formal training regarding online security, though three participants reported receiving some direction about creating more secure passwords from a family member or friend, and one participant said he had received an email from Yahoo with tips on keeping his account safe. Table 3 . Mean ratings for the consideration of "ease of remembering" when creating a password. Scale ranges from from 0 = not at all important, 1 = slightly important, 2 = somewhat important, to 3 = very important. 
Perceived security risk
Overall, low-literacy participants seemed to perceive low levels of security risks for their online information. Only one participant perceived any serious risk from having his accounts compromised. Participants were primarily concerned about the potential invasion of privacy and/or loss of account access that could result from a compromised account, and did not discuss issues of fraud or stolen identity. In some cases, this was because they had no sensitive personal or financial information online. In fact, two participants stated that they purposely avoided doing any banking online because they did not think their information would be safe. Of the six participants who reported that they did have an account compromised, either through hacking or unauthorized access, two did not change their passwords. One of these participants did attempt to change her password, but eventually gave up after several unsuccessful attempts at generating a new password that met the requirements. Another participant reported losing her list of passwords which was written down on a sheet of paper, but she did not change any of them.
Sixteen of 20 participants stated that passwords should never expire, and that passwords should only be changed when or if the user chooses to change them.
While the larger study found that between 3% and 22% of the general population did not consider their passwords secure (depending on password type), and between 7% and 24% indicated they did not know whether or not their passwords were secure (Chisnell & Newby, 2015) , all the low-literacy participants rated their passwords as at least somewhat secure, and more than 70% rated their passwords as very or completely secure. No low literacy participants rated their passwords as not at all secure or said they did not know if their passwords were secure.
Sharing passwords
Passwords were commonly shared with friends and family members. More than half of our low-literacy participants (11 out of 20) shared their passwords with one or more people. In four cases, participants enlisted the aid of more technically savvy friends or family members to help create a password. These family members/friends were sometimes called upon when the participant could not remember the password.
"My granddaughter helped me, I'm safe with her."
In cases where participants shared a password with a family member, this was often because the family member shared one or more accounts or devices with the participant.
Remembering passwords
For those who used their passwords regularly, remembering which passwords were used for which account was an easier task. For those who were only occasional Internet users, remembering passwords was difficult, often resulting in participants writing their passwords down for reference.
"To keep from going back or it rejecting me I just always have [my passwords] in front of me."
Though all passwords were encoded with meaningful, personal information, some participants still needed a written back-up. Five participants reported writing their passwords down on a piece of paper, one participant recorded passwords in a cell phone, and five participants recorded their passwords both on paper and in their cell phone. For those who wrote down their password information on paper, all but one kept the written copy in an insecure, non-locked location. Three kept their list of passwords by their computer, while two participants reported keeping password information in their purse. Three of these participants did attempt to disguise their passwords on the paper. One of these participants chose to write the letter component of his password on one part of the page, and the numerical component on a different part. Another attempted to disguise his true password by adding additional incorrect passwords to the same page, organizing it so that correct passwords were on one side of the page and incorrect passwords were on the other side.
DISCUSSION
Though low-literacy users face additional cognitive burdens when having to create, recall and manage passwords, we found that this user group utilizes many of the same strategies that have been reported in previous password research. Such strategies included the reuse or recycling of old passwords, along with the use of meaningful words, names, numbers, or dates within the passwords. The use of names and nicknames was high among low-literacy users, because of both their memorability and perceived security. However, one of the potential dangers for this user group is the perception that a secure password is one that is difficult to guess rather than one that is difficult to crack by a hacker. Even information that many of our participants thought would be difficult to guess could be easily accessed by others, such as names of family members and birthdates.
As computer literacy tends to be low among this user group, it was unsurprising to find a low level of knowledge concerning password security. The level of security of the participants' passwords did not seem to be strongly affected by the content it was protecting or the perceived consequences of the account being hacked. Previous research has shown that a password strategy employed by some users is to assess the level of security needed on a site (i.e., risk if compromised), then generate or reuse a password with a corresponding level of security. For example, a user may use a group of random letters and numbers as a security precaution on a banking site, but may use a relatively insecure password such as a single word when creating an account for an online news site. This type of behavior was not observed in any of the 20 interviews with low literacy participants, potentially due to the strong perceptions of secure passwords held by the participants. For almost every participant, password strength was determined by the minimum requirements set forth by the website/account the user was on.
Creating new passwords was a fairly rare occurrence among this user group, as password reuse was very high and only one participant described using an account in which the passwords expired. However, for the participants who were required to create brand new passwords, the experience was challenging. For the one participant who had to create new passwords after they expired, the burden of remembering the new passwords made his account difficult to access. Difficulty understanding and complying with password requirements also forced another user to retain a password that may have been compromised.
Limited password use among low-literacy users
It is important to note that while this study explores password use and security knowledge among low literacy participants with password protected accounts, the use of passwords is not necessarily common among this user group. Recruitment for this study proved difficult, as many of the individuals with low literacy skills that we spoke to had no password protected accounts, either as a result of low computer literacy or limited internet access. Additionally, within the subset of users in this population who did use the Internet on a fairly regular basis (either on a computer or on a mobile device), password use was not necessarily common. Some individuals only accessed the internet for browsing purposes, using only sites that did not require a password such as YouTube or Google. As online communication was not a primary concern for this particular group of users, they often did not have an email address or were unable to remember the password (or user name) for an account they had previously created. This confirms findings from previous research about the difficulty low literacy Web users experience in creating accounts (Summers et al., 2006) . Future research remains to be done in order to explore perceptions of password security within the low-literacy population as a whole, as opposed to perceptions about password security held by the subgroup of Web users with low literacy who do use passwords (as in the current study).
CONCLUSION
The low-security strategies used by our low-literacy participants to create passwords were not unique to them; high-literacy participants have been observed to use the same strategies, although to a lesser extent. The most surprising finding was the high perception of security associated with these low-security passwords. High literacy computer users are more likely to know of good security practices, although they may not follow them. But these low-literacy participants did not know that their passwords were flawed, and they had a fundamentally inaccurate mental model of the risk of hacking, assuming this would be carried out by another human rather than computer code. Our research experience also suggests that the challenges posed by password requirements for low-literacy participants are actually understated in our research, since many potential low-literacy participants were not successful enough in creating and using password-protected accounts to qualify for the study.
